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INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute (ALI) has just completed the Re-
statement of the Law, Employment Law (the Restatement).  Chapter 2
is entitled “Employment Contracts: Termination.”1  As the name sug-
gests, the Chapter focuses on the law’s difficult challenge of applying
contract law to distinguish lawful terminations of employees from
wrongful ones.2  The question is especially difficult because, on the
one hand, employment law’s long-existing default rule allows employ-
ers to terminate employees “at will” and without cause.3  Advocates of
the at-will doctrine present several policies to support it, including
freedom of contract and efficiency.4  On the other hand, employers
seek to attract talented employees and, once employed, establish an
“orderly, cooperative and loyal work force.”5  Toward that end, nu-
merous judicial decisions and scholarly research reveal unsurprisingly
that employers design their communications to attract employees and
create loyal workers.6  Further, as I have stated elsewhere, some
communications
induce employees to change jobs, forgo job searches, accept job
conditions, or otherwise change position.  In the context of a plenti-
ful labor supply, high costs of employee relocation, and material
and psychic investments by employees in their jobs, non-union em-
ployees often lack the bargaining power, resources, information,
and wherewithal to withstand employer inducements.7
It is no wonder, then, that contract law’s approach to indefinite-dura-
tion employment issues includes decisions policing employer
1 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW ch. 2 (2015).
2 The Restatement addresses tort theories for wrongful terminations in other
chapters.
3 See Robert A. Hillman, The Unfulfilled Promise of Promissory Estoppel in the Employment
Setting, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 25 (1999) [hereinafter Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise] (“Employ-
ment at will has been the default rule for employment duration for more than 100 years.”).
4 See infra notes 19–25 and accompanying text; see also Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, R
supra note 3, at 25–26 (“Several policies support the [employment-at-will policy].  The prin- R
ciple of freedom of contract means that employers should be free to hire and fire their
labor force (and employees to quit their jobs) in the absence of agreement otherwise.  In
theory, employment at will is also efficient because, in the face of uncertain changes in
technology and business, it allows parties to exit precisely when ‘total gains (to both par-
ties) from continuing the relationship fall short of the total gains from termination.’”
(footnotes omitted)) (discussing arguments in favor and in opposition).
5 See, e.g., Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, at 4 (quoting Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980)).
6 See id.
7 Id. at 4–5 (footnotes omitted).
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overreaching and thereby creating counter-rules that limit employ-
ment at will.8
Given this clash of policies between termination at will and its
limitations, the primary challenge for the reporters of the new Re-
statement in Chapter 2 was to search through the cases and identify
the circumstances in which terminated employees should be entitled
to legal protection, no easy task given the multitudinous and amor-
phous case law on employment discharge, the dynamic labor market
atmosphere and, perhaps most important, contract law’s lack of a uni-
fying theory of its own.9  Related to this challenge, the ALI’s concep-
tion of a restatement seemingly allows reporters to venture beyond
describing the law (but cautiously).10  The reporters therefore had to
decide what constitutes the appropriate mix of description and pre-
scription in their efforts to assess the contradiction in employment
policies.
This Essay focuses on Chapter 2’s treatment of employment at
will, on the one hand, and promissory estoppel and good faith, on the
other, as examples of how Chapter 2 meets these challenges.  The Es-
say concludes that Chapter 2 establishes a useful framework and help-
fully identifies the issues for the courts.  Because promissory estoppel
and good faith (and other contract doctrines) are themselves indis-
tinct, however, Chapter 2 often cannot resolve the principle and
counter-principle dilemma in particular cases and therefore cannot
fully satisfy ALI’s goal of clarifying and modernizing the law through
restatements.  For the same reason, I doubt that a project in the form
of a restatement will be particularly helpful to those who seek to en-
hance employee protection if the playing field is uneven.
8 In this Essay, I refer to principles favorable to employees in indefinite-duration
contracts such as promissory estoppel and good-faith performance as counter-rules, not
exceptions, to reflect the ambivalence on whether at-will or the counter-principles form
the central core of employment-contract termination.
9 Stewart Schwab sees some coherence in termination law:
The life-cycle framework that courts have developed provides the parties in
a career employment relationship a legal structure that checks opportunis-
tic behavior.  Its fundamental premise is that both employer and employees
can act opportunistically.  Consequently, a life-cycle analysis does not cate-
gorically condemn or celebrate employment at will.  It supports, in broad
outline, the contract law inroads that have been made on the at-will doc-
trine, particularly at the beginning and the end of an employee’s career,
and it explains the continued vitality of the at-will rule for mid-career em-
ployees.  The current position of the courts is superior to a dogmatic insis-
tence on the old at-will regime, which creates an excessive risk of
opportunistic terminations for long-term, and sometimes beginning-career
workers.  Moreover, the current hesitant, intermediate position may also be
superior to a general just-cause standard, which would lead to excessive
shirking by midcareer workers.
Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92
MICH. L. REV. 8, 61 (1993).
10 See infra Part II.A.
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Part I of this Essay focuses on Chapter 2’s treatment of employ-
ment at will, promissory estoppel, and good faith.  Part II evaluates the
approaches and argues that the Chapter establishes a helpful frame-
work.  Part II also asserts that the Chapter leaves much for case law
development, which is inevitable when drafting in the shadow of con-
tract law.  Part III ruminates on what a Principles of Employment Law:
Termination could have looked like, freed from the strictures of a
restatement.
I
AN OVERVIEW OF “EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: TERMINATION”
Section 2.01 of Chapter 2 of the Restatement presents the at-will
principle and inventories the counter-rules treated in subsequent sec-
tions of the Chapter.11  Here I focus on sections 2.01 (at-will default
rule),12 2.02(b) (promissory estoppel),13 and 2.07 (implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing).14  Many of the issues I identify are not
unique to these sections, but instead illustrate the challenges of restat-
ing employment termination law in the shadow of general contract
law.
A. Section 2.01: Default Rule of an At-Will Employment
Relationship
Section 2.01 affirms the employment-at-will principle, but also
references the counter-rules:
Either party may terminate an employment relationship with or
without cause unless the right to do so is limited by a statute, other
law or public policy, or an agreement between the parties, a binding
employer promise, or a binding employer policy statement
(§ 2.02).15
Comment b conceptualizes the employment relationship as contrac-
tual, meaning that contract law’s set of default rules apply unless dis-
placed by the parties’ agreement or other law.16  Comment b and the
Reporters’ Notes to Comment a point out that forty-nine states in-
clude some form of the employment-at-will default rule.17  Comments
11 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW ch. 2 (2015).
12 Id. § 2.01.
13 Id. § 2.02(b).
14 Id. § 2.07.
15 Id. § 2.01.
16 Id. § 2.01 cmt. b.  For a discussion of employment agreements as contracts, see infra
notes 89–94 and accompanying text.
17 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.01 cmt. b. (2015) (“The high courts in 49 states
and the District of Columbia recognize as the default rule the principle that employment is
presumptively an at-will relationship.”). Id. at § 2.01, Reporters’ Notes, cmt. a  (“The at-will
default rule is presently recognized in 49 states and the District of Columbia.”).
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c through e reference the series of counter-rules listed in section 2.01’s
boilerplate.18  Section 2.01 thus sets up the chasm between rule and
counter-rule that the drafters address in the rest of the Chapter.
Advocates and critics of the at-will rule pronounce strong policy
reasons in support of their positions.19  In brief, theorists in favor of
the at-will rule cite freedom of contract and assert that the rule re-
flects the parties understanding of their relationship.20  They question
whether common-law courts have the authority to supplant such a
long-established default rule.21  In addition, the rule arguably is effi-
cient because “in the face of uncertain changes in technology and bus-
iness, [the rule] allows parties to exit precisely” when the gains from
doing so exceed the gains from continuing the employment.22  Fur-
ther, based on their observation of relatively few for-cause employ-
ment contracts and their surmise that employees receive higher pay
for at-will arrangements, proponents assert that the parties seek such
agreements.23  In addition, the threat of termination without cause
arguably creates incentives in employees not to shirk or otherwise mis-
behave.24  Finally, courts may apply employment at will most often to
midterm employees, precisely when employee shirking is most
prominent.25
On the other hand, critics of the at-will rule refer to the adverse
consequences of the principle because of employees’ financial
18 Id. § 2.01 cmt. c–e.
19 Some of these arguments are found in comment a to section 2.01.
20 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.01, Reporters’ Notes, cmt. a (2015); see also id. (cit-
ing Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984);
Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge
Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901 (1996) (employers have a property right in at-will
employment)).
21 See generally Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal
Law: Reassessing American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343 (2014).
22 Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, at 25–26 (citing Sherwin Rosen, Commen- R
tary: In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 983, 983 (1984)).
23 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 20, at 966–67 (“Matters are very different where the R
employer makes increased demands under a contract at will.  Now the worker can quit
whenever the net value of the employment contract turns negative.  As with the employer’s
power to fire or demote, the threat to quit (or at a lower level to come late or leave early) is
one that can be exercised without resort to litigation.”).
24 Id. at 965 (“These devices can visit very powerful losses upon individual employees
without the need to resort to legal action, and they permit the firm to monitor employee
performance continually in order to identify both strong and weak workers and to com-
pensate them accordingly.  The principles here are constant, whether we speak of senior
officials or lowly subordinates, and it is for just this reason that the contract at will is found
at all levels in private markets.”).
25 Schwab, supra note 9, at Part III.B.3; id. at 39 (“[E]mployers are especially vulnera- R
ble to opportunism at the employee’s midcareer.  The cases suggest that courts are sensi-
tive to this life cycle.  Courts are most likely to scrutinize firings at the beginning and end
of the life cycle.  Courts do not get involved during midcareer unless they see an obvious
case of particular opportunism, such as a firing before a pension vests or a sales commis-
sion is due.”).
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dependence and lack of mobility.26  In addition, contrary to the view
of proponents of at-will employment, critics claim that employees ex-
pect for-cause termination and rightfully worry about inappropriate
employer motives for terminating them.27  Employees also may rea-
sonably rely on employer communications that suggest for-cause em-
ployment, as the next subpart suggests.28
B. Section 2.02: Agreements and Binding Employer Promises or
Statements Providing for Terms Other than At-Will
Employment
Section 2.02 provides in (a) that employment is not terminable at
will if the parties have an agreement otherwise.29  Subsections (c)
through (e) refer to employer policy statements, good faith, and
“other established principles” as also limiting employment at will.30
Section 2.02(b), the focus here, states that “[t]he employment rela-
tionship is not terminable at will by an employer if . . . a promise by
the employer to limit termination of employment reasonably induces
detrimental reliance by the employee (§ 2.02, Comment c).”31
Section 2.02(b) and its reference to Comment c invoke the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel.32  Restatement (Second) of Contracts
section 90 supplies the promissory estoppel rule that courts almost
uniformly apply.  It reads:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
26 See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Just Notice] (“Early just cause litera-
ture emphasized the inherent unfairness of an at-will system and the potential for em-
ployer abuse.  Scholars cited workers’ financial dependence, minimal mobility, and
emotional investment in their work as explanations for employee vulnerability to abusive
terms and the threat of discharge.” (footnote omitted)).
27 Id. at 10 (“Consistent with their exploitation critique, these advocates presented at-
will employment as enabling arbitrary, malicious, and even socially harmful employer be-
havior.  At-will termination was thus conflated with the condemnation of morally reprehen-
sible employer motives.”(footnote omitted)).
28 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.01, Reporters’ Notes, cmt. a (2015).  But a just-
cause rule may insufficiently protect employees who may be unable to prove employer
arbitrariness. See Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 26, at 17–21 (“As employment at R
will defenders have argued, the effectiveness of a just cause rule depends on the likelihood
that employees will pursue and prevail on legal claims of employer violation.  In contrast to
just cause in collective bargaining relationships, just cause in individual employment rela-
tionships generally requires that the aggrieved worker prove the absence of any cause for
his or her termination and do so under a definition of cause highly deferential to manage-
ment interests.  This one-two punch of procedural and substantive hurdles significantly
diminishes the value of a just cause rule to its intended beneficiaries.” (footnote omitted)).
29 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.02(a) (2015).
30 Id. § 2.02(c)–(e).
31 Id. § 2.02(b).
32 Id.
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and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if in-
justice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.33
Initially, promissory estoppel supplied a remedy for a promisee’s rea-
sonable but uncompensated reliance on a gift promise.34  Courts ex-
panded the doctrine to enforce promises in contracts that were
unenforceable for reasons such as indefiniteness or the lack of a writ-
ing,35 and some courts now even apply it to negotiations before the
parties reach an agreement.36  Despite this expansion and although
analysts surmised that promissory estoppel would dominate in the
courts, it has not been very successful overall.37  Part of the reason is
that enforcing promises outside of the traditional theory of bargained-
for exchange is controversial.38  It is therefore not surprising that
employees face formidable hurdles when bringing promissory
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979).
34 See Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, at 3; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF R
CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b, illus. 3 (1979) (“A promises to make a gift of $10 to B.  In reliance
on the promise B buys a book from C and promises to pay C $10 for it.  There is no
consideration for A’s promise.  As to the enforcement of such promises, see § 90.”).
35 Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, at 3–4 (citing Daniel A. Farber & John H. R
Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the “Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 903, 907 (1985)) (“[C]ourts expanded the theory [of promissory estoppel] to in-
clude not only gift promises, but commercial promises unenforceable because of some
technicality such as the statute of frauds or indefiniteness.”).
36 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267, 274–77 (Wis. 1965).  The case
is “the most famous of the cases that founded a new area of contract law by allowing recov-
ery of reliance expenses incurred before a contract had been formed.”  William C. Whit-
ford & Stewart Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores: The Rest of the Story, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
801, 803 (2010).
37 Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empiri-
cal and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 588–96 (1998); id. at 588 (“Section A
presents data on win rates, which are relevant to the question of the importance of promis-
sory estoppel as a theory of obligation.  The data show a very low success rate of promissory
estoppel claims.  The data further show that this low success rate is not attributable to a
single or a few subject areas or a single or a few contexts.  The conclusion is therefore
inescapable that promissory estoppel has not become the dominant theory for the enforce-
ment of promises.”).
A subsequent empirical study of promissory estoppel cases reported a much larger
success rate. See Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel:  An Empirical Analy-
sis Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. REV. 669 (2010).  However, Profes-
sor Jimenez searched for cases that included the “as justice requires” language from the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts because he wanted to test the influence of the Restate-
ment on the cases.  But by doing so, he created a strong filter that likely yielded more
successes than accurately reflects the field. In short, courts may be much more inclined to
use “justice” language in successful decisions.  Professor Jimenez acknowledged this point
in his article. See id. at 694 n. 91.
38 See, e.g., Whitford & Macaulay, supra note 36, at 806 (suggesting that the Wisconsin R
Supreme Court’s decision seemed controversial) (“After we have related our story in full,
in the conclusion we will return to the benefits of storytelling, and indicate what we think
we have learned from our study of the full facts of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores.  These findings
suggest that the case reached a just result, and one that would be less controversial if facts
not previously fully known had been understood in the many discussions of this famous
case.”).
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estoppel claims.  The following discussion considers and adds to the
Restatement’s treatment of promissory estoppel and inventories the
significant hurdles employees face in bringing such a claim.
1. Was There a Promise?
A promise consists of “an assurance, in whatever form of expres-
sion given, that a thing will or will not be done. . . .  [A promise is]
meant to give an assurance as to a future event.”39  Courts must distin-
guish general statements such as compliments about work quality or
positive statements about an employee’s career from definite assur-
ances of job security.40  Comment c to section 2.02 specifically refers
to this challenge: “The promise must be definite enough to reasona-
bly induce the action taken in reliance on the promise and must in
fact induce such reliance.”41  Nevertheless, some courts find that an
implied promise is enough.  For example, one court found that an
employer’s listing of sanctions if an employee interviewed elsewhere
meant that the employer “promised” not to increase the sanctions be-
yond those listed.42  Another employer told her employee that “she
did not need to look for another job” and the court found that state-
ment actionable.43
The majority of courts, however, seem too willing to grant sum-
mary judgment against the employee on the question of whether the
employer made a definite promise.  Statements such as your “job was
secure” and “there was no need . . . to look for other employment,”44
“[you will]  continue to have a career with [the employer] until age
sixty-five,”45 and “[you will] “remain employed by the company”46
should be sufficient for an employee to defeat summary judgment on
39 Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661, 664–65 (Minn. 1960).
40 See Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, at 12–14 (discussing cases where the R
court defeated a promissory estoppel claim due to a lack of a definite promise).
41 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.02 cmt. c (2015).
42 See Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, at 20 (discussing Board v. Simmons R
Indus., Inc., No. C3-94-116, 1994 WL 454738, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1994)) (“[A]
supervisor told at-will employee Board that if he participated in job interviews elsewhere he
‘would receive either a written warning or a three-day suspension.’  The court affirmed a
jury finding that this statement constituted a promise that the stated repercussions would
be the maximum penalty and that Simmons would not dismiss Board for attending the job
interviews.  Further, the court affirmed the jury’s finding that Board would not have at-
tended the interviews if the supervisor had ‘threatened termination.’” (footnote omitted)).
43 Id. at 21 (quoting Howard v. Kuehnert, No. 95APE09-1197, 1996 WL 145517, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1996)).
44 Corradi v. Soclof, No. 67586, 1995 WL 322311, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 1995),
discussed in Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, at 13. R
45 Dickens v. Equifax Svs., Inc., No. 95-1217, 1996 WL 192973, at *5 (10th Cir. Apr.
22, 1996), discussed in Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, at 14. R
46 Dickens, 1996 WL 192973, at *5.  The court stated that the supervisor’s statements
“were not sufficiently definite to be legally enforceable promises for purposes of establish-
ing promissory estoppel.” Id. at *6.
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the issue of whether the employer made a definite promise, but the
courts considering these statements did not agree.47
In addition, some courts too easily find on a motion for summary
judgment that any promise made was too ambiguous to enforce.
These courts look for unnecessary detail that the law should require
only for enforcing a contract, such as a specific duration or compensa-
tion.48  Comment c to section 2.02 appears to relax the need for such
specificity at least in the case of an oral agreement: “If the conditions
for promissory estoppel are present, then a promise may be enforcea-
ble even though an agreement itself would not be enforceable for lack
of a written document.”49
2. Did the Employee Rely on the Promise?
A prominent issue is whether the employer made the promise
concerning job terms or retirement benefits before or after the em-
ployee agreed to the employment or decided to retire.50  If the agree-
ment or retirement came first, of course, the employee cannot show
that the promise induced the reliance, a requirement made explicit in
comment c to section 2.02.51  In addition, I have previously written
that
[a]s a general matter, courts required employees to allege and es-
tablish more than that they accepted or continued a job or failed to
look for a substitute job.  Employees had to show that they rejected
other distinct offers or opportunities.  Courts ignored the fact that
failing to enter the job market itself could constitute a distinct detri-
ment that would severely undermine an employee’s ultimate pros-
pect for career success.52
Illustrations 1 and 2 to comment c follow the decisions that require
employees to demonstrate that they turned down a distinct offer.53
47 See Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, at 12–14 (noting that in Corradi and R
Dickens, the court pronounced summary judgment in favor of the employer, while in How-
ard, the court found for the employee).
48 Id. at 15 (noting cases where the courts found the promise to be ambiguous); see,
e.g., Schoeneck v. Chicago Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 696, 702–03 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (“[T]he evidence does not show that the alleged promise was unambiguous.  The
duration of the employment remains a matter of considerable speculation (as do any of
the other contract terms, none of which were discussed in the conversation at issue).”).
49 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.02 cmt. c (2015).
50 See Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, at 15–16 (discussing detrimental R
reliance).
51 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.02 cmt. c (2015) (“Section 2.02(b) makes clear that
an employer’s promise that reasonably induces detrimental reliance by employees, or indi-
viduals about to become employees, is enforceable under the well-established doctrine of
promissory estoppel, covered in § 90 of the Restatement Second, Contracts.”).
52 See Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, at 16 (footnote omitted). R
53 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.02 cmt. c, illus. 1 & 2 (2015).
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3. Was the Reliance Reasonable?
Although the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 90 fo-
cuses on whether “the promisor should ‘reasonably expect [the prom-
ise] to induce action or forbearance,’” most courts focus on the
promisee and ask whether the promisee’s reliance was reasonable.54
This is not a serious divergence from section 90 because a promisor
should reasonably have expected the promisee to rely when the prom-
isee’s reliance was reasonable.  At any rate, demonstrating the reason-
ableness of the employee’s reliance may be the employee’s most
difficult hurdle.  Courts justifiably are troubled by the reasonableness
of reliance if the parties have not yet nailed down a contract or an
existing contract contradicts promises or representation made less
formally.55
Courts have found that employees who receive inconsistent
messages about their employment cannot reasonably rely on the
favorable one.56  This, of course, disfavors employees if an employer
makes promises to induce the employee to agree to employment only
to disclaim the promised benefits in a subsequent written contract.57
Courts have also held against employees in the opposite situation
where the employee signs a written at-will agreement or even just re-
ceives notice of such, but then relies on a later contradictory commu-
nication promising job security.58  In addition, courts find reliance
unreasonable if the employer’s communication was vague or
ambiguous.59
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979); ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCI-
PLES OF CONTRACT LAW 97 (3d ed. 2014) (noting that while the rule focuses on the prom-
isor’s actions, courts focus on the promisee’s action).
55 See generally Whitford & Macaulay, supra note 36, at 853–54 (presenting the difficul- R
ties with interpreting whether there was an actionable promise in precontractual-reliance
cases).
56 See, e.g., Coll v. PB Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1124 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Where
a written statement conflicts with a prior oral representation, reliance on the oral represen-
tation is generally held to be unreasonable.”), discussed in Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra
note 3, at 16–17 & n.57. R
57 See, e.g., Coll, 50 F.3d at 1124–25 (holding that employee could not have reasonably
relied on conflicting discussions regarding benefits) (“Assuming arguendo that PB in fact
promised Coll that it would create a LTIP worth $1,000,000, Coll could not have reasona-
bly relied on it.  Coll’s employment offer was clearly at odds with his understanding of PB’s
prior oral representations regarding long-term compensation. . . . In short, PB’s refusal to
‘firm up’ the language regarding long-term compensation rendered any reliance on prior
oral representations unreasonable.”).
58 See Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, at 17 & n.60 (citing examples where R
such reliance was unreasonable).
59 See, e.g., Coll, 50 F.3d at 1124, discussed in Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, R
at 17 & n.64 (“Courts also pointed out the close relationship between the absence of a
distinct promise and the lack of reasonable reliance.  In short, any reliance on vague or
conflicting utterances was per se unreasonable.”).
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4. Was the Reliance Unforeseeable?
If an alleged employer’s promise was indistinct or uncertain, it is
an easy step for courts to find any employee reliance unforeseeable.
For example, in one case, an employee relied on the employer’s fail-
ure to give the employee a scheduled job appraisal as indicating that
his job was secure.  The court found that the employer “had no reason
to expect” the employee to rely on this omission.60
5. Other Hurdles
Employees face additional hurdles to proving promissory estop-
pel.  I have summed these up elsewhere:
Courts dismissed employee promissory estoppel claims for an assort-
ment of additional reasons.  These included the speculative nature
of the damages, the lack of injustice because the employee did not
have sufficient education for the position promised, the statute of
frauds, and the preemption by ERISA.  In addition, claimants faced
long odds when the employer was a public agency: “[C]ourts have
consistently refused to give effect to government fostered expecta-
tions that, had they arisen in the private sector, might well have
formed the basis for a contract or an estoppel.”61
This brief assessment of promissory estoppel in the employment
context shows that the Restatement’s recognition of the theory does
not tame the doctrine in the employment termination context.  In ad-
dition, employees will continue to have an uphill battle attempting to
prevail on the theory.  But, in the tradition of an ALI Restatement,
section 2.02(b) contributes by affirming promissory estoppel’s availa-
bility in the at-will termination setting despite some jurisdictions that
do not recognize or narrow its use.62
C. Section 2.07: Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Under section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
every contract includes an obligation of good faith.63  According to
section 2.07 of the Restatement, employment contracts are no excep-
tion, notwithstanding the section’s recognition of the conflict among
60 See Dunn v. NPM Healthcare Prods., Inc., No. 53-06-82, 1994 WL 468281, *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 1994) (citation omitted) (holding that “plaintiff [ ] failed to allege that
the defendant had reason to expect that the plaintiff’s reliance . . . would lead the plaintiff
to discontinue pursuing a possibility of employment”), discussed in Hillman, Unfulfilled
Promise, supra note 3, at 18. R
61 Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 3, at 18–19 (footnotes omitted). R
62 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.02(b) (2015) (an employment relationship is
not terminable at will if a promise by the employer “reasonably induces detrimental reli-
ance by the employee”).
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) (“Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”).
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jurisdictions on whether a good faith obligation exists in employment-
at-will circumstances.64  Undaunted, section 2.07 provides that each
party to an employment contract owes the other “a nonwaivable duty
of good faith and fair dealing.”65
What is the nature of the good faith obligation adopted by the
Restatement?  Although the obligation of good faith has many roles in
contract law, including good-faith purchase and good-faith modifica-
tion,66 good-faith performance is the subject of section 2.07. Good-faith
performance has a long history and writers have spilled lots of ink
explaining it.67  Briefly, good-faith performance “excludes a variety of
types of conduct characterized as involving ‘bad faith’ because they
violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonable-
ness.”68  Courts identify such violations through the process of con-
tract interpretation and gap filling.69  A court can interpret the
content of a contract to include an implied good-faith obligation con-
sistent with the parties’ reasonable expectations.70  In so doing, the
court may draw on its view of what “decency, fairness or reasonable-
ness” requires,71 based on the theory that the parties must have in-
tended to include such principles in their agreement: “Intention not
otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation the
reasonable and probable.”72  Alternatively a court can simply con-
clude that good faith is a mandatory term that imports the commu-
nity’s view of decency and fairness regardless of expectations.73
Typically, a party is in bad faith, however, only if its motive in
64 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.07, Reporters’ Notes, cmt. a (2015).
65 Id. § 2.07(a).
66 HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 54, at 297–98. R
67 For one treatment of its history, see Matthew W. Finkin et al., Working Group on
Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 93, 135–36 (2009) [hereinafter Finkin, Working Group] (“The
implied obligation of good faith in carrying out the obligations of a contract has roots in
Roman law, found expression in the medieval jus commune, and became a major feature in
the civil law, notably in Germany—in the implied obligation of ‘fidelity and faith,’ Treu und
Glauben, under section 242 of the German Civil Code (BGB) of 1900—and elsewhere on
the continent.”).
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979).
69 “[T]he source of good faith lies on the border between contract interpretation and
gap filling.” HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 54, at 300. R
70 According to Judge Richard Posner, “The concept of the duty of good faith . . . is a
stab at approximating the terms the parties would have negotiated had they foreseen the
circumstances that have given rise to their dispute.”  Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941
F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991).
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979).
72 Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921).
73 See Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Mass. 1977) (ex-
plaining the “requirement . . . that parties to contracts and commercial transactions must
act in good faith”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-6\CRN604.txt unknown Seq: 13 10-SEP-15 11:58
2015] DRAFTING CHAPTER 2 1353
performing the contract is to deprive the other party of what it reason-
ably expected or community standards require.74
Section 2.07(a) of the Restatement expressly identifies two kinds
of “nonwaivable” bad faith.75  The section provides that the good-faith
obligation “includes a party’s obligation not to hinder the other party’s
performance under, or to deprive the other party of the benefit of,
their contractual relationship.”76  This language suggests that the Re-
statement’s good-faith obligation is a mandatory gap filler and does
not require a reasonable-expectations inquiry, although in actuality
each path would most often lead to the same result.77  Section 2.07(a)
does not bar other instances of bad faith, although depriving the
other party of the benefits of the contract goes a long way towards
remedying much of the employer excesses identified in the cases.78
Section 2.07(b) seeks to situate the good-faith obligation within
the context of employment at will.79  Here things get dicey.  Subsec-
tion (b) suggests that the at-will default rule applies notwithstanding
“nonwaivable” good faith: “As in all contracts, the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing serves as a supplementary aid in imple-
menting the parties’ reasonable expectations and should not be read
as a means of overriding the basic terms of, or otherwise undermining
the essential nature of, their contractual relationship.”80  Does this
suggest that good faith is waivable after all if the parties agree to an at-
will arrangement?  The challenge for the drafters, of course, was to
harmonize these seemingly contradictory principles.  Perhaps this is
not impossible, at least if examined through the lens of the reasona-
ble-expectations approach to good faith.  As one court said, “[t]hese
two concepts can coexist if careful attention is paid to the objectively
reasonable expectations of the parties to a contract of employment at-
will.”81  But what are the parties’ reasonable expectations in at-will
cases?  More specifically, when is an employer in bad faith for termi-
nating an employee notwithstanding the employer’s right to termi-
nate without cause?82
74 See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 373 (1980) (“When a discretion-exercising party may
determine aspects of the contract, such as quantity, price, or time, it controls the other’s
anticipated benefits.  Such a party may deprive the other of these anticipated benefits for a
legitimate (or good faith) reason. The same act will be a breach of the contract if under-
taken for an illegitimate (or bad faith) reason.” (citation omitted)).
75 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.07(a) (2015).
76 Id.
77 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. R
78 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.07(a) (2015).
79 Id. § 2.07(b).
80 Id.
81 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 448–49 (Del. 1996).
82 “[I]t is difficult to distinguish a ‘bad faith’ discharge from a no-cause dis-
charge . . . .”  Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 749 (Idaho 1989).
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Section 2.07(c) attempts to answer this question.83  Drawing on
employment cases that have found bad faith, subsection (c) reveals
two mandatory exceptions to the employers’ right to terminate an at-
will employee.84  Under (c)(1), an employer is in bad faith if it “termi-
nate[s] or seek[s] to terminate” an employee in order to prevent the
employee from realizing rights or benefits that the employee would
otherwise receive under the employment contract.85  An employer is
also in bad faith under subsection (c)(2) if its motive for terminating
an employee is to retaliate against the employee for lawful conduct
under the employment contract or other law.86  The Restatement
therefore ultimately finds limitations on the employer’s right to termi-
nate without cause—an employer is in bad faith if motivated by the
desire to deprive the employee of its benefits or to retaliate.
Illustration 1 to section 2.07 reveals the Restatement’s approach
in section 2.07(c)(1).87  Based on Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,88
the illustration posits that an employer fires its sales employee, who
had executed a sale of equipment, without cause.  The result of the
termination was that the employee lost twenty-five percent of a com-
mission that would have been due according to the express contract if
the employee had remained employed when the employer delivered
the equipment and thirty days had elapsed without a customer com-
plaint.  The illustration concludes that the employee “has an action
against” the employer for the commission lost as a result of the termi-
nation.  The illustration leaves unanswered whether the employee can
recover additional expectancy damages.
In the actual Fortune case, the court affirmed a jury verdict that
the employer’s termination was in bad faith.89  Because Fortune only
sought compensation for the lost commission, the case is not author-
ity for the conclusion that the employee has no other rights after the
termination.90  Other decisions support that conclusion, however.91
83 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.07(c) (2015).
84 Id.
85 Id. § 2.07(c)(1).
86 Id. § 2.07(c)(2).
87 Id. § 2.07 cmt. c, illus. 1.
88 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
89 See id. at 1258.
90 See id. at 1253.
91 See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1041–42 (Ariz.
1985) (“The covenant does protect an employee from a discharge based on an employer’s
desire to avoid the payment of benefits already earned by the employee, such as the sales
commissions in Fortune . . . but not the tenure required to earn the pension and retirement
benefits . . . .  Thus, plaintiff here has a right to receive the benefits that were a part of her
employment agreement with defendant Hospital.  To the extent, however, that the bene-
fits represent a claim for prospective employment, her claim must fail.  The terminable-at-
will contract between her and the Hospital made no promise of continued employment.
To the contrary, it was, by its nature, subject to termination by either party at any time,
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This seems inconsistent with the finding of bad faith or at least too
limiting of its effect.  If the employer’s conduct violated norms of “de-
cency, fairness, or reasonableness,”92 there seems little reason to insu-
late the employer from liability for the employee’s lost future income
as well (subject to the usual limitations of expectancy damages), not-
withstanding the at-will relationship.  Put another way, good-faith per-
formance and at-will employment are not in conflict and “coexist”
under these circumstances because the employee’s “objectively rea-
sonable expectations,” notwithstanding the employee’s at-will status,
are that the employer will not terminate the employee to deprive the
employee of commissions and that the employer will be liable for ex-
pectancy damages if the employer does so.93
Illustration 1 to section 2.07 and, for that matter, the Fortune case
itself do not sufficiently underscore additional difficult hurdles em-
ployees face in establishing a bad-faith termination even under section
2.07’s framework.  Perhaps most challenging, the employer may point
to express contract language that seemingly permits termination.
How can an employee reasonably expect a commission, for example,
if the contract expressly excludes one under the circumstances?  Sec-
tion 3.05 of the Restatement, dealing with the good-faith obligation in
the context of compensation and benefits, appears to narrow em-
ployee rights in the face of just such express contract language.94
Comment b to the section says “the implied duty does not override the
express terms of the parties’ agreement or alter the essential nature of
their contractual relationship.”95  Illustration 2 to section 3.05, build-
ing on the Fortune case, posits that a term of the employment contract
expressly states that if the employee is not on the payroll thirty days
after the customer receives the equipment without complaint the ad-
ditional twenty-five percent commission goes to the employee “servic-
ing the customer account,” not the terminated employee.96
Illustration 2 concludes that the terminated employee “has no claim”
against the employer for the commission.97
Comment b to section 3.05 and Illustration 2 seem too restrictive
of employee rights.  In fact, the court in Fortune expressly stated that
subject only to the legal prohibition that she could not be fired for reasons which contra-
vene public policy.”).
92 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. R
93 This conclusion satisfies the instruction set forth in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 448–49 (Del. 1996) (asserting that good faith and at-will em-
ployment “can coexist if careful attention is paid to the objectively reasonable expectations
of the parties to a contract of employment at-will.”), quoted supra in text accompanying
note 81. R
94 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 3.05 (2015).
95 Id. § 3.05 cmt. b.
96 Id. § 3.05 cmt. b, illus. 2.
97 Id.
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“[a]ccording to a literal reading of the contract, NCR [the employer]”
did not breach the contract, but it still found for the employee be-
cause of the employer’s bad faith.98  Other courts facing just such cir-
cumstances also reason that courts should interpret express terms
with the view that the parties likely intended a fair and just interpreta-
tion of them.  For example, in Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell,99 an employer
expressly enjoyed “sole discretion” to alter sales quotas of its employ-
ees.100  The employer raised the sales quotas, which deprived the em-
ployee of certain commissions.101  Then Judge Scalia nonetheless
stated:
[A]greeing to such a provision would require a degree of folly on
the part of these sales representatives we are not inclined to posit
where another plausible interpretation of the language is available.
It seems to us that the ‘sole discretion’ intended was discretion to
determine the existence or nonexistence of the various factors that
would reasonably justify alteration of the sales quota.  Those factors
would include . . . an unanticipated volume of business from a par-
ticular customer unconnected with the extra sales efforts of the em-
ployee assigned to that account; and . . . a poor overall sales year for
the company, leaving less gross income to be expended on commis-
sions. . . . But the language need not (and therefore can not reason-
ably) be read to confer discretion to [increase] the quota for any
reason whatever—including . . . a simple desire to deprive an em-
ployee of the fairly agreed benefit of his labors.102
Under the facts of illustration 2, it would be unusual if either the em-
ployer or the sales employee reasonably expected that the term giving
twenty-five percent of the commission to the servicing employee ap-
plied in situations where the employer’s sole reason for terminating
the sales employee was to deprive the sales employee of the commis-
98 Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (Mass. 1977) (“Accord-
ing to a literal reading of the contract, NCR is correct.  However, Fortune argues that, in
spite of the literal wording of the contract, he is entitled to a jury determination on NCR’s
motives in terminating his services under the contract and in finally discharging him.  We
agree.  We hold that NCR’s written contract contains an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and a termination not made in good faith constitutes a breach of the
contract.”).
99 727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
100 Id. at 1150 (“We think, moreover, that the permissibility of such adjustment is the
most plausible estimation of the contract’s intent.  The language, to begin with, is unquali-
fied: ‘management reserves the right to change . . .  individual quota and reserve payments
at any time during the quota year within their sole discretion.’”).
101 See id. at 1149.
102 Id. at 1154; see Robert A. Hillman, Good Faith Performance of Contracts in Late Twenti-
eth-Century American Law, in PRESCRIPTIVE FORMALITY AND NORMATIVE RATIONALITY IN MOD-
ERN LEGAL SYSTEMS 330–31 (1994).  Some courts agree with this reasoning because it
appeals to a sense of justice and invokes the parties’ likely intentions, thereby theoretically
preserving contractual freedom.  Other courts show concern that such an approach bends
and stretches the notion of consent. Id. at 331 & nn.27, 28.
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sion.  Further, such conduct, I would argue, contradicts the commu-
nity’s view of fairness and decency.
Employees must also show that the employer’s motivation was to
deprive the employee of its just deserts.  In a way, Fortune is an unfor-
tunate precedent in this regard, at least from the perspective of those
interested in employee rights.  This is because the evidence appears
almost a slam dunk for Fortune.  As the court says, “[w]e think that
the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom
support a jury verdict that the termination of Fortune’s twenty-five
years of employment as a salesman with NCR the next business day after
NCR obtained a $5,000,000 order . . . was motivated by a desire to pay
Fortune as little of the bonus credit as it could.”103  Under the facts of
Fortune, therefore, the court likely felt little contrition about interpret-
ing the express terms of the contract to disapprove of such a termina-
tion.  Employees likely will not have such striking evidence in the
typical case.
The approach in section 2.07 raises additional difficult ques-
tions.104  The Restatement leaves open the possibility that section
2.07(c) is not meant to preclude other instances of bad-faith termina-
tion.105  Those exceptions, if any, await common-law development,
which will entail the difficult challenge of further harmonization of at-
will employment and good faith.  Obviously, if examples build up, the
at-will principle necessarily will recede in importance, and courts must
remain aware of the importance of balancing at-will and other
principles.106
In sum, the Restatement’s move to place good-faith performance
within the province of employment at will is a useful affirmation in the
employment setting of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ recog-
nition of the obligation.  Inevitably, as with the Restatement’s nod to
promissory estoppel, additional clarification awaits case law
development.
103 364 N.E.2d at 1258 (emphasis added).  But NCR paid the commission to another
employee so NCR did not gain from its actions. Id. at 1254 (“NCR did pay a systems and
installations person the remaining 25% of the bonus commissions due from the First Na-
tional order although contrary to its usual policy of paying only salesmen a bonus.  NCR,
by its letter of November 27, 1968, had promised the services of a systems and installations
person; the letter had claimed that the services of this person, Bernie Martin (Martin),
would have a forecasted cost to NCR of over $45,000.  As promised, NCR did transfer
Martin to the First National account shortly after the order was placed.”).
104 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.07 (2015).
105 See infra notes 106, 162.
106 Comment c to section 2.07 states that “[t]his Section sets out two principal (though
not necessarily exclusive) applications of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in
the employment context.” RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.07 cmt. c (2015).
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D. Other Exceptions to At-Will Employment in Brief
I have chosen to focus on promissory estoppel and good-faith
performance as examples of the Restatement’s approach to accommo-
dating at-will employment termination and its counter-principles.  Ad-
ditional sections of Chapter 2 follow a similar approach.  Concepts
such as mutuality of obligation107 and material breach,108 for exam-
ple, are helpfully situated within an employment contracts framework,
but the drafters largely leave development of their content to future
cases.109  This is not meant as a criticism.  As with promissory estoppel
and good-faith performance, drafting in the shadow of contract law
makes this strategy inevitable.
II
THE RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW CHAPTER 2:
AN EVALUATION
A. What is the Purpose of the ALI Restatement of Employment
Law?110
It is fair to say that the Restatement and Chapter 2 were not re-
ceived favorably by some academic critics during and after the draft-
ing process.111  I will discuss some of the criticism shortly.  Some of
the fireworks can be attributed to the ambiguous role of ALI Restate-
ments.  At bottom is the question of whether Restatements literally are
supposed to “restate” existing law or whether they have a normative
goal as well.  To evaluate Chapter 2, some clarity about the project’s
purpose is necessary.  This part therefore briefly discusses ALI’s
charge to the drafters of their Restatements.
The ALI lays out its overall goals on its website: “The American
Law Institute is the leading independent organization in the United
States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise
improve the law.”112  According to the website, the work of the restate-
ments was originally conceptualized as an effort to clarify the law:
107 Id. § 2.03 cmt. f.
108 Id. § 2.04(a).
109 Chapter 2’s treatment of “cause” is much more detailed and is very helpful. See id.
§ 2.04.
110 I understand that ALI is in the process of reworking its definitions of Restatements
and Principles.  The discussion here is based on the formulation by ALI at the time the
reporters drafted the Restatement of Employment Law.
111 See, e.g., Finkin, Working Group, supra note 67, 138–41 (identifying limitations of the R
draft’s reach).  But ALI’s membership present at the May 2014 annual meeting approved
the final three chapters of Restatement by a voice vote (after having approved the rest of
the Restatement earlier). See ALI Approves Final Restatement Third of Employment Chapters,
with Samuel Estreicher as Chief Reporter, NYU LAW, http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/Estreicher-
ALI-third-restatement (last visited July 31, 2015).
112 ALI Overview: Overview, ALI, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.over
view (last visited July 31, 2015).
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“The founding Committee had recommended that the first undertak-
ing of the Institute should address uncertainty in the law through a
[R]estatement of basic legal subjects that would tell judges and law-
yers what the law was. The formulation of such a [R]estatement thus
became ALI’s first endeavor.”113 Today, a Handbook for Reporters
and others involved in projects describes Restatements as “aim[ing] at
clear formulations of common law and its statutory elements or varia-
tions and reflect[ing] the law as it presently stands or might plausibly
be stated by a court.”114  The main goal of restatements, it is therefore
fair to say, is to clarify the law.  According to ALI’s website, the ALI
intends another type of project, ALI’s “Principles of the Law,” to do
the main normative work: “The Institute also engages in intensive ex-
amination and analysis of legal areas thought to need reform.  This
type of study generally culminates in extensive recommendations for
change in the law and usually is published as Principles of the Law.”115
Strictly speaking, then, the Restatement’s foremost goal should
be to consider the ever-increasing, overly amorphous body of law and
to boil it down into a clearer, coherent set of rules.116  But, of course,
that is easier said than done.  Reporters have to pick and choose
among conflicting rationales and holdings especially where there is
no sense of a “majority rule” among courts or a consensus among ex-
perts on what is the better rule.117  They must employ standards such
as good faith and reasonableness to capture the essence of some cases,
which often only raises issues as to the meaning of such standards in
various contexts.118 Reporters also must restate rules they fear may be
over- or under-inclusive, which, of course, is not much of a
113 ALI Overview: Projects, ALI, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.insti
tuteprojects (last visited July 31, 2015).
114 AM. LAW INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HAND-
BOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK, 3–4 (2005), available at
http://www.ali.org/doc/ALIStyleManual.pdf [hereinafter ALI HANDBOOK].
115 ALI Overview: Projects, supra note 113.  “Principles do not purport to restate but R
rather pull together the fundamentals underlying statutory, judicial, and administrative law
in a particular legal field and point the way to a coherent (a principled, if you will) future.”
ALI HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at vii.  Maureen O’Rourke and I were the Reporters of the R
“Principles of the Law of Software Contracts.”  We chose to write “Principles” instead of a
Restatement in large part so that we could illuminate what we thought the law should be.
Publications Catalog: Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, ALI, http://www.ali.org/index
.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=121 (last visited July 31, 2015).
116 Sources of information about rules include published and unpublished opinions,
court orders, court dockets, legal briefs, and scholarship, adding to the challenge for re-
staters.  Thanks to David Hoffman for this point.
117 See Edwin W. Patterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 33 COLUM. L. REV.
397, 400 (1933) (“The meaning of Restatement becomes still more ambiguous when one
looks at the diverse theories as to the interpretation of precedents.”).
118 See James Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficulties, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 140, 147 (1981) (“Consequently, the drafters may have only two alterna-
tives.  They may formulate a rule that is cloudy and does not clearly describe which cases
should come out which way.  Or they might formulate a rule that is clearer but is too broad
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clarification of the law at all.119  In addition, it is no secret that Re-
statements often delve into what the law should be despite the demar-
cation between Restatements and Principles projects.120  In fact, the
Reporters Manual licenses such activity, albeit at a modest pace:
Restatements—“analytical, critical and constructive”—accordingly
resemble codifications more than mere compilations of the pro-
nouncements of judges. . . .  Although Restatements are expected to
aspire toward the precision of statutory language, they are also in-
tended to reflect the flexibility and capacity for development and
growth of the common law.  They are therefore phrased not in the
mandatory terms of a statute but in the descriptive terms of a judge
announcing the law to be applied in a given case.  A Restatement
thus assumes the perspective of a common-law court, attentive to
and respectful of precedent, but not bound by precedent that is
inappropriate or inconsistent with the law as a whole. . . . A signifi-
cant contribution of the Restatements has also been anticipation of
the direction in which the law is tending and expression of that de-
velopment in a manner consistent with previously established prin-
ciples.  Restatements are instruments for innovations of this sort.
Nevertheless, the improvements wrought by Restatements are neces-
sarily modest and incremental, seamless extensions of the law as it
presently exists. An unelected body like The American Law Institute
has limited competence and no special authority to make major in-
novations in matters of public policy.  Its authority derives rather
from its competence in drafting precise and internally consistent
articulations of law.121
With the hurdles to clarification mentioned in Part I of this arti-
cle, and keeping in mind the charge to ALI Reporters, I evaluate the
Restatement in the next subpart.  I focus on the latter part of the state-
ment in the Reporters’ Manual, which appears to harmonize ALI’s
somewhat conflicting descriptions of what Restatements are designed
to do.  In short, is Chapter 2 of the Restatement a “precise and inter-
nally consistent articulation[ ]” of employment termination and are
the improvements suggested “modest and incremental, seamless ex-
tensions” of present law?
or too narrow.  It sweeps in some cases that call for the opposite result or leaves out some
that call for the same result.”).
119 Id. at 150–51 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 90’s admonition to
apply it only “if injustice can  . . .  be avoided by enforcement of the promise” as an exam-
ple of a rule which the drafters realized could be overly broad or overly narrow, and which
they qualify as to give notice that the rule should be applied as written).
120 The Restatement’s foray into the law of good faith is an example. RESTATEMENT OF
EMP’T LAW § 2.07 (2015).
121 ALI HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at 5. R
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B. Does Chapter 2 Satisfy the Goals of a Restatement?
Chapter 2 of the Restatement satisfies the goals of a Restatement.
The Chapter is largely a helpful and accurate framework of current
law with incremental normative extensions.122  For example, the Re-
statement situates at-will employment and the counter-principles with-
out a heavy hand in either direction.123  Moreover, it affirms the use
of promissory estoppel notwithstanding remaining tension in the case
law.124  Chapter 2 also suggests that promises can be enforceable with-
out the specificity demanded of enforceable contracts.125  In addition,
Chapter 2 not only recognizes the good-faith performance principle
in the employment setting but also adopts it as a mandatory term de-
spite the jurisdictions that still debunk the theory.126  In addition, the
Restatement helpfully identifies the two most prominent kinds of bad
faith in the cases.127
Another manner of evaluating Chapter 2 is by considering some
of the criticism of the Chapter.  One complaint often heard was that
the project lacked a unifying theory,128 but instead employed a “bal-
kanized approach.”129  Doubters also suggested that contract law was
not a useful vehicle for analysis.130  Further, critics regretted the tim-
ing of the drafting of the Restatement, worrying that it would “freeze”
unsettled or developing law.131  So, should the Restatement have
122 It is more than a “repackaging” of common law. But see Rachel Arnow-Richman,
Response to Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Putting
the Restatement in its Place, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 143, 143 (2009) [hereinafter Arnow-
Richman, Response] (“Thus, in the most benign terms, the draft repackages the common
law, adding nothing of value in the process.”).
123 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §§ 2.01, 2.02 (2015).
124 Id. § 2.02(b).
125 Id. § 2.02 cmt. c.
126 Id. § 2.07.
127 Id. § 2.07(c)(1)–(c)(2).
128 “In assessing parties’ rights and obligations, some courts, in some contexts, veer
toward contract formalism, emphasizing issues of assent, consideration, and narrowly de-
fined contract defenses.  Other courts in the same contexts (or the same courts in different
contexts) place greater emphasis on bargaining disparities, relational norms, and policy
considerations, often bending contract rules to achieve larger goals.  Thus, a Restatement
of employment law could comprise a meaningful contribution to the field if it were to
expose or suggest a governing theory of employment contracts.”  Rachel Arnow-Richman,





130 Id.  “Absent a clear theory of the relationship between contract and employment,
the Restatement cannot serve as a comprehensive or even useful account of how the law
treats recurring factual problems.” Id.
131 See, e.g., Finkin, Working Group, supra note 67, at 94–95 (2009) (“Certainly, the ac- R
tion of a reputable organization such as the ALI issuing a document that this particular
statement of the at-will rule is the law, if in fact it is not accurate, would be damaging to the
long-term common law process of refining rules by evolution.”).
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presented a unified theory?  Is contract law the appropriate concep-
tual framework, notwithstanding its pluralism?  Should ALI have em-
barked on a Restatement of Employment Law at this time?
1. Should the Restatement Have Presented a Unified Theory?
Some analysts criticized the Restatement for lacking an underly-
ing, unifying theory,132 as if such a thing would magically explain em-
ployment (and termination) law and protect employees under the
appropriate circumstances.  Indeed, Chapter 2,133 although denomi-
nated Employment Contracts: Termination, does lack such a theory
but, as with general contract law, there is no underlying theory that
would capture the richness of the law of termination of employment
contracts.134  For example, promissory estoppel is an independent
theory of obligation and in truth is closer to tort law than contract.135
Good-faith performance depends on fairness and justice and thus in-
troduces elements that are independent of assent and agreement.  Be-
cause general contract law has no overarching theory of its own it is
no surprise that a treatment of employment law would not either.  By
identifying the issues and situating the diverse legal principles that
arise in the termination context, the Restatement will be helpful to
courts.  This is all that an attempt to corral the law of employment
termination can hope for.
2. Is Contract Law the Appropriate Conceptual Framework for
Employment Agreements?
Notwithstanding contract law’s heterogeneity, dissenters worried
that it is unfit to regulate employment arrangements: “Can a relation-
ship really be deemed a contract at all if it’s unbreachable?”136  Tech-
nically, under contract law’s mutuality-of-obligation requirement, the
critics have a point.137  Employment-at-will arrangements are illusory if
the parties have no obligation to each other.138  But if employers have
an obligation to give notice of termination, the employment contract
would be enforceable.139  In addition, if an employee has supplied
consideration to support an employer’s promise of just-cause employ-
ment or employment of a certain duration, such as by leaving another
132 See, e.g., supra note 128 and accompanying text. R
133 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW ch. 2 (2015).
134 See generally ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND
CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW (1997) [hereinafter HILLMAN,
RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW].
135 Id. at 43–77.
136 See Finkin, Working Group, supra note 67, at 110. R
137 Id. at 117.
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto
Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953, 958 n.20 (2006).
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job at the request of the employer, contract law enforces the em-
ployer’s promise.140  These examples meet all of the requisites of an
enforceable contract.141
More important, to deny employment termination the contract
imprimatur would only impoverish the analysis.  In its broadest con-
ception, a contract is “a promise or set of promises for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy or the performance of which the law
recognizes as a duty.”142  Of course, such a definition does not tell us
very much because it only leads to the question of when is a promise
enforceable.143  But by calling employment termination a contract
problem in Chapter 2, the Restatement thereby invokes the whole
body of precedent establishing what promises are enforceable and
why.  Such an inquiry encompasses agreements supported by consid-
eration, detrimental reliance on a promise, quasi contracts and more
and, as shown, applies to the mutuality problem discussed above.  If
contract was replaced as an analytical tool, the existing framework for
examining theories such as promissory estoppel and good-faith per-
formance would also be lost at little or no gain.
3. Should ALI Have Embarked on a Restatement of Employment Law
at This Time?
The law and the society it governs do not stand still, and I doubt
that there is ever an optimal time to restate the law.  This is especially
true of employment termination law because of the dynamic nature of
labor markets and because of the effect of new technologies on the
nature of business activities. Still, a plausible argument can be made
that the common law has not moved very much on employment at will
and its counter-principles in the last twenty years or so.144  Whatever
the trend, the Restatement performs a useful service now by identify-
ing issues and presenting a framework for future development.  In
140 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1419 & n.74 (1967) (“If the
employee in addition to his services has given other ‘good’ consideration, such as forego-
ing a claim against the employer or giving up a business to accept the employment, the
agreement will be enforced on behalf of the employee even though he is free to quit at any
time.”).  But many courts are reluctant to accept this approach. See, e.g., STEWART MACAU-
LAY, JEAN BRAUCHER, JOHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM WHITFORD, CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 440
(3d ed. 2010) (“However, few courts have been willing to protect an employee whose ‘addi-
tional consideration’ consisted of leaving a good job to take one with a new employer,
relying on a promise of permanent employment.  You cannot just find something that you
can label as consideration and assume that a promise of permanent employment will be
enforceable.  This is a very limited exception to the general at-will rule.”).
141 See, e.g., Blades, supra note 140, at 1419. R
142 Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Minn. 1960).
143 See id.
144 E-mail from Stewart Schwab to Robert Hillman (Sept. 27, 2014) (on file with
author).
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addition, because employment termination relies on broad principles
such as reasonableness and good faith, it can hardly “freeze” the law.
Perhaps a helpful analogy to the Restatement’s role is the use by law-
yers of preliminary agreements that memorialize terms in negotiation
and form the outline for future agreements.145  The Restatement and
preliminary agreements share a common goal of seeking to organize
and simplify an ongoing project once an abundant amount of data
has been amassed.
Further, future development of the common law of employment
termination is hard to predict.  Are courts going to whittle away at at-
will employment or, on the other hand, narrow counter-principles?
So those in favor of greater employee or employer rights cannot confi-
dently prefer the common law to what the Restatement has to offer.146
III
WHAT IF THE PROJECT HAD BEEN “PRINCIPLES OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW?”
In this part, I ponder the following question: Suppose the ALI
project on employment termination in Chapter 2 had been part of a
“Principles” project instead of a restatement.  What might “Employ-
ment Termination Principles” look like?  I should disclose that my ef-
forts for the ALI as reporter of Principles of the Law of Software Contracts
freed me, my associate reporter, and my advisors from the restraints of
a restatement and allowed us to ponder more directly what the law
should be.147  As the introduction to the Principles states, “[i]nstead of
restating the law, a ‘Principles’ project accounts for the case law and
recommends best practices, without unduly hindering the law’s adapt-
ability to future developments.”148  Because the nature of a restate-
ment is different from a principles project, however, I do not mean to
suggest that the drafters of the Restatement necessarily should have
145 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: EXISTENCE OF CONTRACT WHERE
WRITTEN MEMORIAL IS CONTEMPLATED § 27 (1979) (suggesting that under certain circum-
stances “manifestations of assent” may serve as preliminary negotiations setting up a frame-
work for later written memorials of agreement).
146 See Arnow-Richman, Response, supra note 122, at 145 (“I share the [w]orking R
[g]roup’s desire for greater protection for workers . . . . I do not share the working group’s
assumption that common law, left to its own devices, will achieve that end.  I believe we
have already seen the best of organic judicial innovation and should be concerned equally
with the preservation of existing employee contract rights as we are about the effect of the
proposed Restatement on the judiciary’s instinct for further reform.”).
147 See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text. R
148 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 2 (2009). Other
Principles projects include Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommen-
dations and Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations.
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (2000); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS (1992).
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adopted any of the following suggestions.  Nor do I want to suggest
that the following “Principles” are anything more than my own view of
the path that employment termination should take.  (I must admit it is
a luxury to make suggestions without having to balance the rather ad-
amant views of opposing interests.)  But I would argue that the follow-
ing suggestions, although mainly bolstering employee protections,
also preserve the important role of employment at will.  My focus is
again on Chapter 2’s use of promissory estoppel and good-faith per-
formance as counter-principles to the default rule of at-will
employment.149
As part of a “Principles” project, the Reporters could have elabo-
rated on how promissory estoppel should operate in the context of at-
will employment.  As I described in Part I, crucial are whether the
employer made a promise and whether the employee should have rea-
sonably relied on the promise.150  For purposes of evaluating whether
a communication constituted a promise, contract law’s rules of inter-
pretation should apply.  First, courts should examine the words of the
communication to see whether under their dictionary meaning they
constitute an assurance as to future job security.  Looking at the plain
meaning of language such as your “job was secure” and “there was no
need . . . to look for other employment,” or “[you will]  continue to
have a career with [the employer] until age sixty-five,” or “[you will]
remain employed by the company,”151 it is difficult to see how these
communications can be anything other than “an assurance” of a se-
cure future with the employer.  The absence of more detail, such as a
specific duration, should not matter when examining the dictionary
meaning.  As already noted, comment c to section 2.02 of the Restate-
ment, although dealing with the statute of frauds, arguably reinforces
this approach: “If the conditions for promissory estoppel are present,
then a promise may be enforceable even though an agreement itself
would not be enforceable for lack of a written document.”152  In a
“Principles” project the language of the Comment could have read
more broadly that a promise may be enforceable although not defi-
nite enough to be an enforceable contract.153  For that matter, section
2.02(b) in a Principles project could have invoked a broader concep-
tion of estoppel, for example, to include conduct that induces reasona-
ble reliance.154
Next, a Principles project could focus on the circumstances in
which the employer made the assurance, including the presence of an
149 See supra Part I.B.–C.
150 See supra notes 39–40, 54 and accompanying text. R
151 See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text. R
152 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.02 cmt. c (2015).
153 See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965).
154 Section 2.02(d) helps fill the void.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-6\CRN604.txt unknown Seq: 26 10-SEP-15 11:58
1366 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1341
express or default rule of at-will employment. As with general contract
law’s use of trade custom, course of dealing, and course of perform-
ance to fill out the reasonable meaning of agreements, employment-
termination principles could look to these sources of meaning to sup-
plement the plain meaning of a communication and to determine
whether the employee’s reliance was reasonable.  As for the issue of
reasonable reliance, if an employer tells an employee that “your job is
secure” and employees regularly rely on such a statement in the par-
ticular trade, that should be strong evidence that the employee’s reli-
ance was reasonable.155  Similarly, if the employer has made such
statements in the context of previous employment relationships with
the employee and the employee relied on them, this course of dealing
suggests the employee is reasonable to rely once again.156  Finally, if
the issue involves a cluster of positive communications from the em-
ployer, this course of performance would be relevant in determining
the reasonableness of reliance.157
In assessing the reasonableness of an employee’s reliance, a Prin-
ciples project could also devote more attention to the often uneven
relationship between employer and employee. To review, many em-
ployees have invested their time, money, and psyche in their job.  Fur-
ther, they may have few or no alternatives and believe the employer
will look out for their welfare.  These employees lack the wherewithal
to withstand employer inducements designed to create a loyal work
force.158  Contract law evaluates the reasonableness of a party’s actions
by taking into account the attributes and circumstances of the relying
actor.159  To determine whether an employee reasonably relied on the
employer’s inducements, therefore, a court should ask what a reasona-
ble party in the shoes of the employee would have done.
A Principles project on employment termination could also reject
cases that dismiss an employee’s reasonable reliance when it consists
of failing to enter the job market.  If the evidence reveals that the
employee could have secured other work but was induced not to test
the market and the evidence proves with sufficient certainty what the
employee’s new salary would have been, there is little reason to bar
such evidence or reject that theory of recovery.  In fact, under the
avoidable-consequences rule, courts use such evidence against
155 U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2014) (defining a “usage of trade”).
156 Id. § 1-303(b) (defining a “course of dealing”).
157 Id. § 1-303(a) (defining a “course of performance”).
158 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. R
159 See HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 54, at 48–49 (2014) (“Con- R
tract law determines what a reasonable person would believe by examining the circum-
stances, including the language of the alleged agreement, the length of negotiations, the
subject matter of the contract, the setting of negotiations, the previous conduct of the
parties, the relationship of the parties, and anything else that may be relevant.”).
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employees to diminish their damages for wrongful termination if the
employee does not accept reasonable alternative employment.160
As for the good-faith obligation, a Principles project on employ-
ment termination could follow the lead of then Judge Scalia in the
Tymshare case and clarify that courts should not automatically allow
express language to trump the good-faith obligation.161  Instead,
courts should interpret express terms in light of the likelihood that
the parties intended performance to be fair and reasonable.
A Principles project also could be more attentive to how courts
determine the motives of an employer who fires an employee.  The
test should be objective as in general contract law: based on the cir-
cumstances, what would a reasonable person believe was the em-
ployer’s motive?  And the project could enumerate additional
examples of possible bad faith motives.  Such motives may include
personal animosity toward a highly functioning employee or retalia-
tion for the employee’s reasonable conduct outside of employment.162
Firing an employee for such reasons belies the employee’s reasonable
expectations or the community’s view of fairness even in an at-will em-
ployment arrangement.  In addition, an employer who justifies termi-
nation by fictionalizing the grounds for dissatisfaction with the
employee’s performance is in bad faith because an employee or the
community would not reasonably expect such conduct even in an at-
will contract.163
For the reasons already discussed, a Principles project could es-
tablish that an employer who terminates an employee in bad faith to
deprive the employee of commissions should be liable for the em-
ployee’s commissions, but also a fair quantum of expectancy damages
notwithstanding the at-will relationship.164  This result, although likely
contrary to the prevailing view,165 improves the law by creating an ad-
ditional employer incentive not to terminate in bad faith.
Finally, ambitious drafters of a Principles project could account
for today’s reality of employees increasingly at risk of termination and
160 See id. at 174.
161 See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. R
162 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.04 (2015). Reporters’ Notes to comment b cites
cases that support such additional bad-faith examples. See also Finkin, Working Group, supra
note 67, at 138 (2009) (arguing that a limitation of the draft of the Restatement of Employ- R
ment Law was its foreclosure of “any judicial inquiry into dishonesty, malice, or more” that
may motivate an employer to fire an employee). But see E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 438 (Del. 1996) (“What constitutes malice or bad faith depends
on the intent of the persons effectuating the termination.”).
163 See Pressman, 679 A.2d at 443–44.
164 See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.  The theory would be that but for the R
bad-faith termination employment would have continued for a reasonable amount of time.
165 See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1041–43 (Ariz.
1985).
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facing frequent job searches.  According to one analyst, “[w]hat we
need going forward is a contract theory of worker protection that fo-
cuses on enabling continued labor market participation rather than
preserving particular jobs.”166  One approach to this problem in a
Principles project would be to find that good-faith performance re-
quires meaningful notice before termination and severance pay if no-
tice is not feasible because of unforeseen conditions.167  Perhaps this
is not too much of a stretch under the reasonable-expectations or
community-standards approaches of good-faith performance.  But
such an approach obviously raises significant issues, including
whether such protection makes economic sense and, if so, how to im-
plement the strategy.  As to the former issue, the benefits of protect-
ing employees may be greatly outweighed by the costs to employers of
creating an obligation in the context of negative business circum-
stances.  As to the latter, questions arise such as when must notice be
given and how should severance pay be calculated?  Relatedly, would
employers pass on the costs of such a program to employees in the
form of reduced wages?168  Perhaps any such strategy in favor of em-
ployees terminated in poor economic times would best be handled in
a statute that lawmakers could model after existing efforts.169
CONCLUSION
Contract law is useful and succeeds in guiding exchange transac-
tion largely because it is multidimensional and practical.170  It lacks a
dominant vision, but instead embraces disorder and contradiction.
This is a good thing because no single theory could encompass the
entire set of social and economic forces that are implicated in ex-
change agreements.171
Chapter 2 of the Restatement on termination embodies a subset
of contract-law issues, so it should be no surprise that the Chapter
reflects contract law’s heterogeneity.  So the problem of sorting out
lawful terminations of employees from wrongful ones cannot be re-
solved; it can only be tempered by establishing a useful framework.
Based on an analysis of Chapter 2’s treatment of at-will, promissory
estoppel, and the obligation of good faith, and based on the goals of
an ALI Restatement, the Restatement of Employment Law largely
meets this challenge.
166 Arnow-Richman, Response, supra note 122, at 152. R
167 See Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 26.  Notice is not required in many at-will R
jurisdictions. See Finkin, Working Group, supra note 67, at 108. R
168 For possible responses to these questions, see Professor Arnow-Richman’s fine arti-
cle, Just Notice, supra note 26. R
169 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012).
170 See HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 134, at 268–69. R
171 See id.
